

SECRET

HR Chrono

REFERENCE

DDI# 4461-82

1 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Your Memorandum on Estimates, dated 20 May

1. We share your concern about the apparent discontinuity of estimative effort on significant intelligence issues and agree with you that some of the topics you mentioned should be added to our research and estimates program.

2. Some of the discontinuity is more apparent than real and the lack of a recent National Intelligence Estimate may in some cases reflect only a preference for using the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum or typescript memorandum format. Directors of Central Intelligence and customers such as assistants to the President for National Security Affairs have had quite different ideas about the value of and place for NIEs, SNIEs, and IIMs. For example, you noted in your memorandum:

a. para 6, no estimate on monitoring Soviet strategic weapons since 1968. That subject was covered last in a comprehensive IIM, issued in 1979 [redacted]

[redacted] The NIO/SP is holding meetings this week for a new estimate.

3. We believe that the NIE may not be the most effective way to address some of these subjects. On International Communism (your para 1), for instance, we believe there may be little to gain by converting the good DI study you mentioned into an NIE. The data on which it would have to be based is almost totally a DDO monopoly, and discussion of the data on the interagency level might simply bog down in protracted arguing (chiefly between DIA and State) over what it all means.

SECRET

SECRET

4. Concerning Argentina (your para 2), we are planning the kind of post-Falklands crisis estimate you mention and will list it on the weekly estimates status report soon.

5. The topic of possible Soviet intervention in Syria (your para 3) was given prominent (though not voluminous) treatment in our recent NIE on

[redacted] and in the SNIE we did in February [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] It had been fully discussed in the 1980 NIE [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted], and the Community representatives decided not to 25X1  
repeat those judgments in full in the two recent estimates cited above.  
The problem of the potential Iran-Lebanon-Syria-Libya axis was also  
discussed in the [redacted] NIE and will be addressed as well in 25X1  
the forthcoming NIE [redacted] that is listed on 25X1  
the current [redacted] 1982 target date. 25X1  
The possible axis is a highly speculative issue and we believe any  
additional treatment would be best presented in a DI or NIC Memorandum.

[redacted] 25X1

7. We will have a more complete understanding of the gaps after studying the chronological listing of NIEs, SNIEs, and IIMs by subject that has just been prepared. We will also try to retrieve the Nixon-Kissinger era NSSM/NSDM interagency typescripts that served as a substitute for some Community estimative work. Another factor concerning these gaps in coverage was that, with the exception of some military estimates, NIE's and SNIE's were neither asked for nor encouraged during the Carter administration.

8. Whatever picture emerges, we will first coordinate the Directorate of Intelligence and National Intelligence Council efforts and then seek Community suggestions for additional topics (and drafting assistance) in the Intelligence Producers Council and the NFIB.

*Henry S. Rowen*  
Henry S. Rowen  
C/NIC

[redacted] 25X1  
Robert M. Gates  
C/DI

SECRET

SECRET

DDI# 4461-82  
1 June 1982

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum on Estimates, dated 20 May

VC/NIC: [ ] lht (1 Jun 82)

25X1

Distribution:

Original - Addressee  
1 - DDCI  
1 - EXDIR  
1 - ER  
1 - DDI  
1 - DDI Registry  
1 - HR Chrono  
1 - HFH Chrono

SECRET